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In the last decade, the concept of ‘global value chain’ (GVC) has become popular to describe the way 
firms fragment production into different stages located in different economies. The ‘made in the world’ 
narrative suggests that production today is global with inputs coming from all parts of the world before 
being assembled into final products also shipped all over the world. The empirical basis of this story has 
however been questioned. On the one hand, recent evidence indicates that there is some kind of 
‘deglobalisation’ with a trade slowdown and lower levels of fragmentation of production. On the other 
hand, some authors suggest that supply chains are regional rather than global. In this paper, we offer a 
comprehensive review of the evidence based on the 2018 update of the OECD Trade in Value-Added 
(TiVA) database and indicators counting the number of domestic and foreign production stages, border 
crossings and geographic length of supply chains. The study covers 1995 to 2016. The made in the world 
narrative is correct when describing the rise of GVCs in the 2000s. But globalisation has reached a peak 
in 2012 and since then supply chains are becoming more domestic rather than more regional. The 
‘erosion’ in globalisation (i.e. the reduction in the average length of supply chains since 2012) is 52 
kilometres per year. 
Keywords 
Fragmentation of production, vertical specialization, global value chain. 




In the last decade, the concept of ‘global value chain’ (GVC) has become popular to describe the way 
firms vertically fragment their production into different stages located in different economies. The 
concept was first introduced by Gereffi et al. (2001) to analyse governance structures in sectors 
producing for global markets and is now widely used to study structural changes in the global economy 
(Gereffi, 2019). 
The ‘made in the world’ narrative suggests that production today is global with inputs coming from 
all parts of the world before being assembled into final products also shipped all over the world. The 
empirical basis of this story has however been questioned. First, even before the rise of protectionism, 
there was a debate about whether GVCs are truly global. For example, Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez 
(2015) argued that global production networks are “marked by regional blocs, what could be called 
Factory Asia, Factory North America, and Factory Europe”. 
Second, following the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, rising protectionism was pointed out 
as a determinant of the globalisation slowdown (Bown, 2018). This protectionism was first observed 
among G20 economies through a more frequent use of non-tariff measures and trade remedies (Evenett, 
2019) and turned into trade wars after 2018 (Crowley, 2019). Falling trade barriers after the creation of 
WTO and decreasing communications cost with the information technology revolution were the main 
drivers of the rise of GVCs in the 1990s. While new technological advances in the digital era can still 
lower trade costs, protectionism can offset the gains from foreign sourcing and encourage firms to source 
locally or from less distant countries, thus triggering a ‘deglobalisation’ (James, 2018). 
Whether we have entered into a new era of deglobalisation and whether GVCs are becoming less 
global is an empirical matter. Several types of indicators based on international input-output tables are 
now available to shed light on these questions (Johnson and Noguera, 2012; Koopman, Wang and Wei, 
2014; Timmer et al., 2014; Los, Timmer and de Vries, 2015; Johnson, 2018). In this paper, we offer a 
comprehensive review of the evidence based on the 2018 release of the OECD TiVA database and 
underlying inter-country input-output (ICIO) tables, including new indicators counting the number of 
domestic and foreign production stages, border crossings and geographic length of supply chains. 
Moreover, in order to look at a longer time period, we add information from the previous edition of 
the OECD database covering 1995 to 2011. The two sets of data are not fully comparable as national 
accounts moved from definitions and standards of the 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) to the 
new 2008 SNA. We present data separately for 1995-2011 and 2005-2016 to make sure that the 
interpretation of results is not affected by this change in national accounting practices. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic value chain tools and the OECD 
ICIO used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 explains how to measure the internationalization of supply 
chains in the conventional way of decomposing value-added by country and industry. It provides the 
first evidence of a deglobalisation in terms of lower levels of foreign value-added in exports. Section 4 
then investigates whether this decline in value-added corresponds to shorter value chains in the sense of 
fewer production stages, building on Fally´s (2012) measure of embodied production stages. Section 5 
reviews the evidence whether supply chains are regional or global and Section 6 whether we see a 
decrease in the geographic length of supply chains in the recent period. Section 7 concludes. 
                                                     
* The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations they 
work for. This paper is an updated version of Miroudot and Nordström (2015), “Made in the World?”, EUI Working Papers, 
RSCAS 2015/60. 
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2. The Leontief model 
We begin with a brief recapitulation of the Leontief model in a single economy setting. The model is 
then extended into a multi-country framework suitable to analyse international supply chains.  
2.1 One country closed economy model 
The input-output table of a closed economy is depicted in Table 1. The first nn elements of the IO-
table record intra- and inter-industry flows of intermediate goods and services, where sales from sector 
i to j are recorded horizontally and purchases vertically. The n+1 column (“Final demand”) records sales 
to final consumers and the n+1 row (“Value added”) outlays on labour and capital that process raw 
materials and manufactured inputs into more valuable outputs. The shaded column to the right reports 
total output (supply) by industry and the shaded column at the bottom total input (use) by industry, 
which in equilibrium are equal in monetary terms. 
Table 1. Input-Output table of a closed economy 
  Using sector j = 1, 2, …, n   
     
  Intermediate demand Final Total 
  Sector 1 Sector 2 … Sector n Demand output 
 Sector 1 z11 z12 … z1n f1 y1 
Supplying 
sector 
Sector 2 z21 z22 … z2n f2 y2 
i =1, 2 ,… , n … … … … … … … 
 Sector n zn1 zn2 … znn fn yn 
 Value Added w1 w2 … wn GDP  
 Total input y1 y2 … yn   
To analyze interactions between sectors, Leontief (1936) proposed a linear model with fixed input 
coefficients and constant returns to scale (CRS). The production functions were specified as: 
  












)  , 
where 𝑦𝑗 denotes the output of sector j, 𝑧𝑖𝑗 inputs from sector i and  𝑤𝑗 inputs of primary production 
factors. The 𝑎𝑖𝑗  coefficients in the denominator specify the minimum input requirements from sector i 
to produce one unit of output in sector j. Since there is no substitutability between different types of 
inputs, firms will employ just the minimum amount of inputs to produce the output demanded by the 
market,  
 
(2)          𝑧𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗. 
The last term in the production function is the input of primary production factors 𝑤𝑗 (value added) 
which enter with coefficient 𝑏𝑗 (which in equilibrium equals 1−∑𝑎𝑖𝑗 under the CRS assumption). This 
part of the model is not well developed: it is just assumed that there is enough primary factors to supply 
all sectors of the economy (either because of elastic supply or flexible factor prices). The model is closed 
by treating final demand as an exogenous variable. 
Under these assumptions, the model boils down to a linear equation system of supply and demand,  
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𝑎11 𝑎12 ⋯ 𝑎1𝑛
𝑎21 𝑎22 … 𝑎2𝑛
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑎𝑛1 𝑎𝑛2 ⋯ 𝑎𝑛𝑛
]




















where 𝒚 denotes the production vector, 𝑨 the input-output matrix per unit of output and 𝒇 the final 
demand vector, and where the product of 𝑨 and 𝒚 gives the intermediate demands for inputs. The 
solution to this equation system (the general equilibrium of the economy) is, 
 
(3)         𝒚 = [𝑰 − 𝑨]−𝟏𝒇,  
    
where [𝑰 − 𝑨]−𝟏 is the “Leontief inverse” that computes the total input requirements from each sector 
to produce the exogenous vector of final demand.1  
2.2 One country open economy model 
Let us now introduce exports and imports into the model. Let´s assume that we have data on the total 
export by sector (x) whilst the import vector (m) is further divided into intermediate and final goods. 
The demand from the world market is treated as an exogenous “variable” just as domestic final demand, 
whereas the demand for intermediate imported goods and services depends on the domestic production. 
The open economy model is described by two blocks of linear equations 
 
(4a)       𝒚 = 𝑨𝑫𝒚 + 𝒇𝑫 + 𝒙 , 
(4b)      𝒎 = 𝑨𝑴𝒚 + 𝒇𝑴, 
where the first block is the supply-equals-demand conditions for domestic goods (superscript D) and the 
second block supply-equals-demand conditions for imported goods (superscript M). The solution to this 
block-recursive equation system is: 
 
(5𝑎)        𝒚 = [𝑰 − 𝑨𝑫]−𝟏(𝒇𝑫 + 𝒙) , 
(5𝑏)      𝒎 = 𝑨𝑴[𝑰 − 𝑨𝑫]−𝟏(𝒇𝑫 + 𝒙) + 𝒇𝑴. 
Note that the open economy version of the Leontief model establishes a direct link between exports and 
imports flowing from the dual assumptions of fixed input coefficients and no substitutability between 
domestic and imported inputs. Specifically, if export demand rise by 𝒅𝒙 units, intermediate imports will 
                                                     
1 As shown by Miller and Blair (2009, p. 33), provided that 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0 for all i and j and ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗 < 1
𝑛
𝑖=1   for all j, the Leontief 
inverse is the solution to an infinite geometric series of 𝑨,  
          [𝑰 − 𝑨]−𝟏 = 𝑰 + 𝑨 + 𝑨𝟐 + 𝑨𝟑 +⋯  , 
 which is the analogue to a geometric series in standard algebra: [1 − 𝑎]−1 = 1 + 𝑎 + 𝑎2 + 𝑎3 +⋯ for |𝑎| < 1. The 
reason why increasingly higher powers of 𝑨 enter the market clearing condition, 
          𝒚 = [𝑰 − 𝑨]−𝟏𝒇 = 𝒇 + 𝑨𝒇 + 𝑨𝟐𝒇 + 𝑨𝟑𝒇 +⋯ = 𝑨[𝑰 − 𝑨]−𝟏𝒇⏟        
𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆
𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏




 is that the suppliers of inputs use inputs themselves, which in turn are produced with yet other inputs all the way back to 
the initial production stage. In equilibrium, the production of each industry must satisfy both the final demand 𝒇 and the 
intermediate needs of all sectors in the economy 𝑨[𝑰 − 𝑨]−𝟏𝒇. 
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have to rise by 𝒅𝒎 = 𝑨𝑴[𝑰 − 𝑨𝑫]−𝟏𝒅𝒙 units in order to produce the additional demand for the world 
market.  
If we apply this model on different country datasets, we can study how integrated various countries 
are in the world economy and the change over time if IO-tables are available for several years. The most 
common index used in this context is the vertical specialization (VS) index proposed by Hummels, Ishii 
and Yi (2001), 
 
(6)       𝑽𝑺 =
 𝒊′𝑨𝑴[𝑰 − 𝑨𝑫]−𝟏𝒙
 𝒊′𝒙
 , 
which measures the import content of the export vector.2 While this is a very useful and data sparse 
indicator, it has some limitations that can only be resolved by linking national IO-tables into a global 
IO-model. For instance, the single country model can only provide an approximate assessment of the 
foreign content since imported inputs may contain domestic inputs that have been processed abroad 
(‘returning value added’).  
2.3 Multi country input-output model 
Extending the Leontief model into an ICIO model is straightforward in theory but demanding on data. 
The starting point is the realization that the world as a whole is a closed economy and hence can be 
modelled in the same way as a closed single country model. Following Koopman, Wang and Wei (2014), 
we formulate the ICIO-model in block matrix notation in order to distinguish as clearly as possible 
between domestic and international transactions. The data is organized in three matrices,  
 
     𝒀 = [
𝒚𝟏𝟏 𝒚𝟏𝟐 ⋯ 𝒚𝟏𝒎
𝒚𝟐𝟏 𝒚𝟐𝟐 … 𝒚𝟐𝒎
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒚𝒎𝟏 𝒚𝒎𝟐 ⋯ 𝒚𝒎𝒎
]
⏟                
𝑚𝑛×𝑚
,    𝑨 = [
𝑨𝟏𝟏 𝑨𝟏𝟐 ⋯ 𝑨𝟏𝒎
𝑨𝟐𝟏 𝑨𝟐𝟐 … 𝑨𝟐𝒎
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑨𝒎𝟏 𝑨𝒎𝟐 ⋯ 𝑨𝒎𝒎
]
⏟                
𝑚𝑛×𝑚𝑛
,    𝑭 = [
𝒇𝟏𝟏 𝒇𝟏𝟐 ⋯ 𝒇𝟏𝒎
𝒇𝟐𝟏 𝒇𝟐𝟐 … 𝒇𝟐𝒎
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝒇𝒎𝟏 𝒇𝒎𝟐 ⋯ 𝒇𝒎𝒎
]
⏟                
𝑚𝑛×𝑚
 ,    
where 𝒀 is a block matrix that defines production by origin, sector and destination markets, 𝑨 is the 
intermediate consumption matrix with domestic IO-links on the diagonal blocs and international IO-
links on the off-diagonal blocks, and where 𝑭 is the final demand matrix by destination markets. In 
general equilibrium supply must equal demand in all sectors and countries, taking into account the 
intermediate consumption used in all production activities: 
 
(7)     𝒀 = 𝑨𝒀 + 𝑭                        
= [𝑰 − 𝑨]−𝟏𝑭.
 
Note that the off-diagonal blocks of 𝒀 constitute the global trade matrix. For example, 𝒚𝟏𝟐 is the export 
of country 1 to country 2; or viewed from the other side, the import of country 2 from country 1. While 
it is not necessary, we shall for clarity define explicit matrices for exports (𝑿) and imports  (𝑴 = 𝑿′) 
in the subsequent analysis. Also 𝑨 and 𝑭 will be partitioned into domestic and foreign blocks as need 
arises, such as in the calculations of how many borders are crossed in a supply chain.  
                                                     
2 Post-multiplication of a matrix by the unit vector 𝒊 creates a column vector with elements equal to the row sums of the 
matrix, while pre-multiplication with 𝒊′ creates a row vector with elements equal to the column sums of the matrix. 
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2.4 OECD Inter-Country Input-Output tables 
The Leontief model is implemented in the 2018 edition of the OECD ICIO that contains annual IO-
tables for 64 economies from 2005 to 2016, accounting for about 92 percent of world GDP. All other 
countries are subsumed in a ‘Rest of the World’ (ROW) region. These tables are the underlying data of 
the OECD Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) database. Countries covered are listed in Table 2 and 
industries in Table 3. The 2008 edition of the OECD ICIO follows definitions of the SNA 2008. We 
complement this dataset with the 2016 edition of the database that had data from 1995 to 2011 in SNA 
1993. Industries in the 2018 edition are in the International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) Rev. 
4, while industries in the 2016 edition are in ISIC Rev. 3. There is only a ‘rough’ one-to-one 
correspondence between the two at the 2-digit level, as illustrated in Table 3. With respect to countries, 
only Kazakhstan was not covered in the previous edition and is excluded from the analysis. 




ISO3 Country Region ISO3 Country Region
ARG Argentina South and Central America KAZ Kazakhstan Other regions
AUS Australia Other regions KHM Cambodia East and South East Asia
AUT Austria Europe KOR South Korea East and South East Asia
BEL Belgium Europe LTU Lithuania Europe
BGR Bulgaria Europe LUX Luxembourg Europe
BRA Brazil South and Central America LVA Latvia Europe
BRN Brunei Darussalam East and South East Asia MAR Morocco Other regions
CAN Canada North America MEX Mexico North America
CHE Switzerland Europe MLT Malta Europe
CHL Chile South and Central America MYS Malaysia East and South East Asia
CHN China East and South East Asia NLD Netherlands Europe
COL Colombia South and Central America NOR Norway Europe
CRI Costa Rica South and Central America NZL New Zealand Other regions
CYP Cyprus Europe PER Peru South and Central America
CZE Czech Republic Europe PHL Philippines East and South East Asia
DEU Germany Europe POL Poland Europe
DNK Denmark Europe PRT Portugal Europe
ESP Spain Europe ROU Romania Europe
EST Estonia Europe ROW Rest of the World Other regions
FIN Finland Europe RUS Russian Federation Europe
FRA France Europe SAU Saudi Arabia Other regions
GBR United Kingdom Europe SGP Singapore East and South East Asia
GRC Greece Europe SVK Slovakia Europe
HKG Hong Kong (China) East and South East Asia SVN Slovenia Europe
HRV Croatia Europe SWE Sweden Europe
HUN Hungary Europe THA Thailand East and South East Asia
IDN Indonesia East and South East Asia TUN Tunisia Other regions
IND India Other regions TUR Turkey Other regions
IRL Ireland Europe TWN Chinese Taipei East and South East Asia
ISL Iceland Europe USA United States North America
ISR Israel Other regions VNM Viet Nam East and South East Asia
ITA Italy Europe ZAF South Africa Other regions
JPN Japan East and South East Asia
Sébastien Miroudot and Håkan Nordström 
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Table 3. Industries in the OECD ICIO (2018 edition in ISIC 4 and 2016 edition in ISIC 3) 
 
In addition to differences in terms of industry classification and country coverage, the most important 
change between the 2018 edition and 2016 edition of the ICIO is the implementation of SNA 2008 
definitions (instead of SNA 1993). In the new SNA, there are two important modifications affecting the 
measurement of GVCs. First, expenses on research and development (R&D) that were previously 
regarded as an intermediate consumption in SNA 1993 are now capitalized and regarded as an 
ISIC 4 code Industry name Short label
ISIC 3 code (rough 
correspondence)
01T03 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing Agriculture 01T05
05T06




Mining and quarrying of non-energy 
producing products
Mining, non-energy
9 Services to mining and quarrying Mining, services
10T12 Food products, beverages and tobacco Food products 15T16
13T15
Textiles, textile products, leather and 
footwear
Textiles & apparel 17T19
16 Wood and products of wood and cork Wood 20
17T18 Paper products and printing Paper and printing 21T22
19 Coke and refined petroleum products Coke, petroleum 23
20T21 Chemicals and chemical products Chemicals 24
22 Rubber and plastics products Rubber & plastics 25
23 Other non-metallic mineral products Non-metal minerals 26
24 Basic metals Basic metals 27
25 Fabricated metal products Fabricated metals 28
26
Computer, electronic and optical 
equipment
ICT & electronics 30T33
27 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec Electrical equipment 31
28 Machinery and equipment, nec Machinery 29
29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers Motor vehicles 34
30 Other transport equipment Other transport 35
31T33




Electricity, gas, water supply, 
sewerage, waste and remediation 
services
Utilities 40T41
41T43 Construction Construction 45
45T47
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles
Wholesale & retail 50T52
49T53 Transportation and storage Transport & storage 60T63
55T56 Accomodation and food services Hotels & restaurants 55
58T60
Publishing, audiovisual and 
broadcasting activities
Publishing, broadcasting n/a
61 Telecommunications Telecoms 64
62T63 IT and other information services IT services n/a
64T66 Financial and insurance activities Finance & insurance 65T67
68 Real estate activities Real estate 70
69T82 Other business sector services Other business services 73T74
84
Public admin. and defence; compulsory 
social security
Public admin 75
85 Education Education 80
86T88 Health and social work Health 85
90T96
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investment. Since (international) R&D is now longer a foreign input and value-added is higher, the new 
indicators record lower levels of foreign value-added in trade. Second, the treatment of goods for 
processing has changed. When there is no change of ownership (i.e. the goods sent for processing abroad 
still belong to the firm asking for manufacturing services), exports and imports of such goods are no 
longer recorded in trade in goods statistics. Instead, there is an export of ‘manufacturing services on 
physical inputs owned by others’, which is an export of services from the processing country to the 
country of the firm asking for the processing. As inputs and processed goods are no longer recorded in 
trade flows, the foreign value-added is also smaller for countries involved in this type of transactions. 
However, it should be noted that not all processing trade is done on the basis of no change in ownership. 
Finally, national accounts are regularly revised by countries and sometimes with significant changes 
in the level of GDP. The 2018 edition of the ICIO includes the latest available tables. Another advantage 
when using the OECD tables is that for China and Mexico data are split for exporting firms and non-
exporting firms. Countries involved in ‘processing trade’, like China or Mexico, may have a different 
use of foreign inputs for products exported and products consumed in the domestic market. These 
differences are captured in the OECD tables. But as highlighted above, these economies are now 
exporting manufacturing services when processing trade involves no change in ownership. 
3. Value added by country: signs of deglobalisation? 
Having equipped ourselves with the basic input-output tools, we shall now address the question of 
whether there is some kind of deglobalisation in world production. We begin by picking apart the some 
2340 supply chains in the OECD ICIO to check who contributed what to each supply chain and the 
value share of their contributions.  
3.1 Supply chain decomposition 
We start from the accounting identity  
 
(8)       𝒊 = 𝑨′𝒊 + 𝒗,  
where 𝒊 is a unit vector of output, 𝑨′𝒊 is the costs of non-primary inputs and 𝒗 is the value-added per 
unit of output. If we iterate this accounting identity backward in the supply chain, we end up with an 
infinite series that decompose the value-added by stage of production: 
 




+ [𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏𝑨′ 𝒗⏟       
𝒖𝒑𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒎
 .  
The contribution by an individual country can be calculated by setting all value-added coefficients to 
zero in the 𝒗 vector apart from the country under consideration. These calculations can be done for one 
country at the time or in one step by redefining 𝒗 as a block-diagonal matrix, 
 
(10)     𝑽 = 𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒗) + [𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏𝑨′𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒗) 
Sébastien Miroudot and Håkan Nordström 
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         = [
𝒗𝟏 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎
𝟎 𝒗𝟐 … 𝟎
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝒗𝒎
]








〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏𝑨′〉𝟏𝒗𝟏 〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]
−𝟏𝑨′〉𝟏𝒗𝟐 ⋯ 〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]
−𝟏𝑨′〉𝟏𝒗𝒎
〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏𝑨′〉𝟐𝒗𝟏 〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]
−𝟏𝑨′〉𝟐𝒗𝟐 … 〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]
−𝟏𝑨′〉𝟐𝒗𝒎
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏𝑨′〉𝒎𝒗𝟏 〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]





⏟                                            
𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 (𝑗=1,2,…,𝑚)
 
The 𝑽-matrix provides a full decomposition of the value-added shares by country for each supply chain 
in the database, where the domestic value-added shares are recorded on the diagonal blocks and the 
foreign value-added shares by country on the off-diagonal blocks. 
3.2 Foreign value-added in total exports  
Figure 1 plots the foreign value-added share in total exports from 1995 to 2016. A simple average is 
used across reporters. Results based on the 2018 edition of the OECD ICIO (SNA 2008) and 2016 
edition (SNA 1993) are reported separately. Since there is an overlap in the period covered by the two 
databases between 2005 and 2011, one can see the difference in results. Foreign value-added shares are 
lower with SNA 2008 data but the trend is similar when it comes to their change over years. 
In 2016, the foreign shares range from 5 to 67 percent, with Saudi Arabia at the low end and 
Luxembourg at the high. The most obvious reasons for the rather large differences we observe are: (a) 
the sector composition of export, (b) economic size and (c) trade barriers on inputs. Other things equal, 
large countries with high trade barriers specializing in raw material exports will use relatively little 
foreign inputs. And the other way round, small countries with low trade barriers specializing in 
processed goods and services will tend to use relatively more foreign inputs. The reason why the size of 
a country matters is economies of scale in production. That is, small countries cannot cost-efficiently 
produce the full range of inputs and will therefore naturally import more foreign inputs than large 
countries. 
Figure 1. Foreign value-added in total exports (1995-2016) 
 
The average foreign value-added share in total exports peaked in 2012 (27%) but it was already close to 
this level in 2008 before the Great Financial Crisis. There was an important trade slowdown during the 
crisis between 2008 and 2009 that affected imports of foreign inputs. But the recovery was quick with 
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foreign value-added shares back to their 2008 level in 2011. It is a different story after 2012 where a 
slow decline is first observed and then more pronounced between 2014 and 2016. From Figure 1, we 
can see that there is some deglobalisation based on the share of foreign value-added in exports (or in 
production since within the ICIO framework, this share is not different for exports and for domestic 
sales, with the exception of China and Mexico for which data are different). 
One important caveat when looking at Figure 1 is that data are in constant prices and, despite the use 
of value-added shares, are impacted by changes in relative prices across years. For example, the 
acceleration in the decline of the foreign value-added share after 2014 may be partially explained by the 
drop in the cost of imports of oil, which account for a significant share of imports of inputs for some 
countries. Removing the coke and petroleum industry from the analysis does not change the fact that 
there is a downward trend but the decrease is smaller. One needs to be aware that the charts we present 
are not in constant prices. Some input-output tables are in previous year’s prices, but tracking prices in 
global input-output matrices is challenging in the absence of detailed price information on imported 
inputs. Empirical work on GVCs is usually in current prices.  
Across industries (results not reported), the foreign input content is generally higher in manufacturing 
sectors than in service sectors. The most ‘globalised’ industries measured from the inputs side are ‘ICT 
& electronics’, ‘coke and refined petroleum products’ and ‘motor vehicles’. 
4. International production stages and border crossings: are GVCs shrinking? 
In this section, we provide additional evidence on the deglobalisation by, firstly, calculating the number 
of production stages that take place outside the country-of-completion, and, secondly, the number of 
borders being crossed. The latter indicator is new to the GVC literature. Lower shares of foreign value-
added in exports could be explained by lower prices for imported inputs (e.g. oil) or fewer inputs sourced 
from abroad but with the same level of fragmentation of production. The foreign value-added share of 
exports does not provide information on the fragmentation of production. For example, a country 
sourcing a single foreign input from a single supplier with a value of 20 and producing 100 would have 
the same share of foreign value-added (20%) as a country producing 100 and sourcing an input from 
country A produced with inputs from country B and country C using further inputs from country D, etc., 
where total foreign value-added could be 20 but split among a broader set of countries upstream in 
different production stages. 
4.1 Fally´s (2012) measure of embodied production stages 
How many production stages are embodied in a supply chain? The answer proposed by Fally (2012) is 
to weigh the value added created at each production stage with the number of stages that these inputs 
will be processed downstream, plus one for the production of the inputs themselves:  
 
(11)      𝒊 = 𝒗⏟
𝟏
+ 𝑨′𝒗
⏟    
←𝟐
+𝑨′𝟐𝒗
⏟          
←𝟑
+ 𝑨′𝟑𝒗
⏟              
←𝟒
+⋯  . 
Thus, the first-tier supplies are weighted by two: one for the production of the inputs and one for the 
downstream assembly into the final product. The second-tier supplies are weighted by three: one for the 
production they supply, one for the assembly into the first-tier supplies, and one for the final assembly. 
Summing this chain using the value shares of the final product results in Fally´s measure of embodied 
production stages:  
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(12)     𝒏 = 𝒗 + 𝟐𝑨′𝒗 + 𝟑𝑨′𝟐𝒗 +⋯         
                  = (𝒊 − 𝑨′𝒊) + 𝟐𝑨′(𝒊 − 𝑨′𝒊) + 𝟑𝑨′𝟐(𝒊 − 𝑨′𝒊) + ⋯
                  
= 𝒊 + 𝑨′𝒊 + 𝑨′𝟐𝒊 + 𝑨′𝟑𝒊 + ⋯
=  [𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏 𝒊
 
The index ranges from one to infinity, where the lower limit is attained if no external inputs are used in 
the production process. This is easiest seen if we divided the index into final assembly and upstream 
production stages (if any): 
 
 
(13)     𝒏 = 𝒊⏟
𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍
𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒍𝒚




Fally´s index is thus a measure of the external fragmentation of a production process, which is as much 
an economic as a technical decision limited by the costs of writing and enforcing contracts relative to 
the economic gains of outsourcing.  
4.2 Production stages by country 
Now, using the same logic as for the value-added decomposition in section 3, we can decompose Fally´s 
measure into production stages by country, 
 
(14)    𝑵 = 𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒊) + [𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏𝑨′ 𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒊) 
                = [
𝒊𝟏 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎
𝟎 𝒊𝟐 … 𝟎
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮






〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏𝑨′〉𝟏𝒊𝟏 〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]
−𝟏𝑨′〉𝟏𝒊𝟐 ⋯ 〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]
−𝟏𝑨′〉𝟏𝒊𝒎
〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏𝑨′〉𝟐𝒊𝟏 〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]
−𝟏𝑨′〉𝟐𝒊𝟐 … 〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]
−𝟏𝑨′〉𝟐𝒊𝒎
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏𝑨′〉𝒎𝒊𝟏 〈[𝑰 − 𝑨′]






where domestic production stages are recorded on the diagonal blocks (divided into final assembly and 
upstream stages) and foreign stages by country on the off-diagonal blocks. 
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Figure 2. Foreign production stages (1995-2016) 
 
The average development for ICIO countries is plotted in Figure 2. As with the foreign value-added, the 
number of foreign stages has steadily increased from 1995 to 2008. The peak is observed in 2008 but 
the value for 2012 is almost the same. Since 2012, GVCs are shrinking with fewer foreign production 
stages. Among countries found to have the highest decrease in the number of foreign production stages 
since 2012 are Korea, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong and China. Asian GVCs seem to be the most affected 
by rising protectionism and by the re-centring of the Chinese economy on its domestic market. With 
wages increasing in China and domestic suppliers of inputs becoming more competitive, there was 
already a trend towards less vertical specialization in China before the recent trade tensions (Duan et al., 
2018). 
4.3 Foreign production stages by sector  
Figure 3a-b plots the trend for individual sectors. As a general rule there are more foreign production 
stages in manufactures than in services, with ‘ICT and electronics’ and ‘motor vehicles’ at the top. The 
general trend is a steady increase in the international fragmentation of production until 2008 followed 
by a drop with the 2008-2009 financial crisis and a structural decrease since 2012. However, not all 
industries follow this pattern. In particular, service industries tend to be less affected, with the production 
of services such as ‘IT services’ and ‘finance and insurance’ becoming more fragmented until 2016. The 
Great Financial Crisis also had a smaller impact on services GVCs, confirming the resilience of services 
trade to macroeconomic shocks (Borchert and Mattoo, 2010). 
Sectors where the decline in the number of foreign production stages is the highest after 2012 are 
first raw material industries, such as ‘coke and petroleum’ or ‘basic metal’. But while the evolution of 
prices can explain a decline in the share of foreign value-added, the indicator based on production stages 
is less affected by prices since it is weighted by the number of stages. Therefore, the results suggest that 
there is a structural change in these industries and for basic metal at least, one can think that it is related 
to protectionism on steel or aluminium. ‘Mining’ is an industry where we do not see a decline in the 
foreign production stages, while ‘basic metals’ and ‘fabricated metals’ record such decline, suggesting 
that the transformation of metals is the industry where value chains are becoming less international. 
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Figure 3a. Foreign production stages by sector (1995-2016) 
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Figure 3b. Foreign production stages by sector (1995-2016) 
 
The second type of industries where we see a decline in the number of foreign production stages after 
2012 are consumer goods such as ‘textiles and apparel’ and ‘ICT and electronics’. Here it is also 
interesting to look at the difference between SNA 2008 and SNA 1993 figures. These industries are 
those where processing trade and contract manufacturing take place and the fact that these transactions 
are no longer recorded in trade in goods in SNA 2008 (when there is no change in ownership) seems to 
have an important impact on the measurement of foreign production, with possibly some information 
lost and an underestimation of the number of foreign production stages. But if we believe the trend 
observed after 2012, these industries are the ones that are also more affected by recent protectionist 
measures, as they are the ones involving China and Asian GVCs. But our figures cannot disentangle the 
impact of protectionism from structural trends related to rising wages and shifts in productivity and 
competitiveness in Asia that would also lead to a consolidation of value chains in the absence of 
protectionist measures. 
4.4 The border effect on supply chains  
While our data cannot tell us the reason why GVCs are shrinking, we can nonetheless try to infer more 
from structural changes in production by trying to assess whether fewer foreign production stages are 
related to a national clustering of activities. If it is more costly to write and enforce contracts with foreign 
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suppliers than with domestic suppliers, or if distance and border costs are important parameters in 
sourcing decisions, supply chains may display national clusters in different branches of the supply chain. 
For example, if a Swedish producer of cars outsources the gearbox to Germany and the suspension 
system to France, the gearbox branch may display a German cluster of sub-suppliers and the suspension 
branch a French cluster, because of the preponderance of using local suppliers. Rising costs of doing 
business with other countries as a consequence of protectionism should for example be manifested not 
only in a decrease in the international fragmentation but also more national clusters in the supply chain.  
To investigate this hypothesis, we begin by dividing 𝑨’ into two parts, 
 
      𝑨𝑫′ = [
𝑨′𝟏𝟏 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎
𝟎 𝑨′𝟐𝟐 … 𝟎
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝑨′𝒎𝒎
] ,     𝑨𝑴 = [
𝟎 𝑨′𝟐𝟏 ⋯ 𝑨′𝒎𝟏
𝑨′𝟏𝟐 𝟎 … 𝑨′𝒎𝟐
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑨′𝟏𝒎 𝑨′𝟐𝒎 ⋯ 𝟎
] ,        
where 𝑨𝑫′ contains the domestic IO-links and  𝑨𝑴(=  𝑨𝑿′) the international IO-links, where the latter 
means that a border is being crossed in the supply chain. Using this decomposition we can decompose 
𝒏 into nationally clustered production stages 𝒏𝑪 and cross-border production stages 𝒏𝑩: 
  
(15𝑎)      𝒏𝑪 = 𝒊 + [𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏𝑨𝑫′𝒊,
 
(15𝑏)      𝒏𝑩 =       [𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏 𝑨𝑴𝒊.
 
Just to be clear, whether a border is crossed is not defined from the perspective of the ultimate user of 
the supplies (the country-of-completion) but from the perspective of the next producer in the supply 
chain. Note also that a border passage is weighted by the value of the inputs that crosses the border 
relative to the value of the final product (normalized to one). Thus, if supplies worth 10 percent of the 
value of the final product cross a border it adds 0.1 to the index. The theoretical range of 𝒏𝑩 is 𝟎 to 𝒏 −
𝒊, where the upper limit is reached if every production stage is undertaken in a different country (possibly 
involving only two countries if the production goes back and forth). The decomposition by country is 
done by replacing 𝒊 with 𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒊): 
 
(16𝑎)      𝑵𝑪 = 𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒊) + [𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏𝑨𝑫′ 𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒊) 
(16𝑏)      𝑵𝑩 =                      [𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏 𝑨𝑴 𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒊) . 
As with the 𝑵-matrix, diagonal blocks correspond to ‘domestic’ production stages. We put ‘domestic’ 
into quotation marks here since a domestic upstream stage can be cross-border when domestic value-
added returns home after one or several production stages abroad. The 𝑵𝑩-matrix will therefore have 
values different from zero in its block diagonal elements. 3 
The decomposition of equation 16 is presented in Figure 4, with the nationally clustered stages at the 
bottom and the cross-border stages on top (adding up to the total number of embodied production stages). 
As shown in the plot, the majority of all production stages are nationally clustered. Only one-sixth of 
production stages are cross-border. 
                                                     
3 In the same way, we can decomposed the value-added by country into nationally clustered and cross-border value-added,  
      𝑽𝑪 = 𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒗) + [𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏𝑨𝑫′ 𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒗) 
      𝑽𝑩 =                        [𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏 𝑨𝑴 𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒗), 
 where returning value added are recorded on the diagonal blocks of  𝑽𝑩. 
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Until 2008, most of the increase in embodied production stages was coming from cross-border stages. 
It is only around 2007-2008 and during the financial crisis that we see a slight increase in nationally 
clustered stages. Post-crisis, the evolution in the number of production stages is still driven by changes 
in cross-border stages. Therefore, we cannot explain the recent change in GVCs by value chains 
becoming more fragmented within countries instead of internationally. If there was a substitution 
between domestic and foreign suppliers, we should see the overall number of production stages 
remaining the same but the share of nationally clustered stages increasing. The evidence does not point 
to this type of substitution. There are fewer cross-border stages (which can still be the consequence of 
protectionism) and shorter GVCs. This result suggests that there are also structural shifts reducing the 
rationale for fragmenting production (across or within countries), which could be related to the digital 
transformation or the servitisation of manufacturing with production becoming closer to consumers. 
Figure 4. Nationally clustered and cross-border production stages in total exports (1995-2016) 
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5. Global or regional? 
A recurrent question in the GVC literature is whether supply chains are becoming more ‘global’ in a 
literal manner, or whether the internationalization of GVCs reflects regional integration, as suggested 
by Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015). Now that we observe a decrease in the fragmentation of 
production, the question is also whether this decrease is affecting both the extra-regional and intra-
regional part of GVCs or whether this decrease is associated with more regionalization of value chains. 
To answer this question, we plot the change in the intra- and extra-regional value-added shares of 
the supply chains between 1995, 2008 and 2016. For the purpose of this exercise, we look at four regions 
for which the OECD ICIO covers the main economies: (i) East and South East Asia, (ii) Europe, (iii) 
North America, and (iv) South and Central America. The countries included in each of these regions 
can be seen in Table 2 in Section 2. The other individual countries of the ICIO are grouped with the ‘rest 
of the world’ and included only as extra-regional partners in this exercise. 
Figure 5. Intra- and extra-regional value added shares in supply chains (%), 1995, 2008 and 
2016 
 
As seen in the pie charts, both the extra-regional and intra-regional shares of the value chains have 
increased between 1995 and 2008, at the expense of domestic suppliers (with the exception of North 
America where the intra-regional share decreased). In all regions, the extra-regional share increased 
more than the regional share. GVCs were becoming more global until the Great Financial Crisis. 
Moreover, with the exception of Europe, more inputs were sourced from outside the region. 
Between 2008 and 2016, the trend is different across regions. In East and South East Asia, value 
chains became more regional in relative terms. There was a strong decrease in the extra-regional share, 
from 17.2% to 12.5%. But inputs sourced from outside the region were replaced by domestic inputs and 
Made in the World Revisited 
European University Institute 17 
not regional inputs. The regional share did not increase in absolute terms. In Europe, the share of intra-
regional value-added decreased and the share of extra-regional value-added increased. Despite the 
economic integration within the EU, value chains in Europe became more global. But the share of intra-
regional value-added is still twice the share of extra-regional value-added, confirming that Europe is the 
region with the most regional value chains. In North America, there is a slight shift towards regional 
supply chains but the decrease in extra-regional value-added after 2008 has benefited domestic supply 
chains. In South and Central America, a very small share of inputs is sourced regionally and this share 
has decreased between 2008 and 2016. 
From the above evidence, there are two main trends to highlight. The expansion of GVCs before the 
financial crisis was clearly global. The decrease in domestic value-added shares was mostly 
compensated by an increase in extra-regional shares. Post-crisis and in the recent period of 
deglobalisation, some regions seem to shift towards more regional value chains but the main trend is 
towards domestic value-added. 
6. Geographic length of supply chains 
As a last piece of evidence we measure the geographic length of supply chains. This approach was 
pioneered by Los and Temurshoev (2012), who combined input-output data with the geographic 
distance between and within countries. Their distance measure includes both the intermediate legs of 
the supply chain and the final leg(s) to the consumers, whereas our focus is on the former. How far away 
do firms buy their inputs and are GVCs becoming also geographically shorter in the recent period?  
As we have no data on the internal supply chains of firms, we can only measure the geographic 
distance of the external network of suppliers. And even here we run into some problems since we only 
have information on which sectors and countries that trade with each other but not their location in the 
countries. The best we can do is to assume that firms are distributed in the same way as the population 
at large, using distance measures calculated by CEPII.4 The total length of a supply chain is calculated 
by adding the distance of each leg using the inputs coefficients of the final product as weights, 
 
(17𝑎)     𝒅 = 𝒅𝟏 + 𝑨′𝒅𝟏 +𝑨′𝑨′𝒅𝟏 +⋯      
                     = [𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏 𝒅𝟏 ,   
 
where 𝒅𝟏 is a vector with input-weighted distances to the first-tier suppliers from the perspective of each 
sector and country in the OECD ICIO. The supply chain can in turn be divided into country legs by 
defining 𝒅𝟏 as a block-diagonal matrix, 
 
(17b)        𝑫 = [𝑰 − 𝑨′]−𝟏 𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒅𝟏).  
The average length of supply chains for the export industry in 2016 is plotted in Figure 6, using sector 
weights in exports. As an aid for the eyes we plot spherical circles from the population-weighted 
centroids of each country with a radius equal to the length of the supply chains.5 The circles are 
calculated under the assumption that supply chains propagates outward like ripples on the water (from 
Sweden, to Germany, to France, etc.) rather than slashing back and forth, and should therefore be 
interpreted with some caution. Notwithstanding, we find them helpful to illustrate the range of the supply 
chains on a map. Europe has generally the shortest supply chains, but still longs enough to cover most 
countries on the continent. In 2016, the longest supply chains are found in Mexico, Singapore, Viet Nam, 
Malaysia and China. 
                                                     
4 Mayer and Zignago (2011). http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
5 The maps are plotted in Winkel-Tripel projection that makes the spherical circles look a bit distorted, especially when the 
radius is large.  
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Figure 6. Average length of supply chains for the export industry, 2016 
 
As shown in Figure 7, the average length of supply chains has increased by more than 500 kilometres 
between 1995 and 2008. The trend exhibits the same pro-cyclical pattern we have observed for the other 
GVC indicators, with a decline in distance after the dot.com and financial crises in 2001 and 2008-2009 
respectively. After 2012, the average distance has decreased by a bit more than 10% from 1940 to 1730 
kilometres. The ‘speed’ of deglobalisation or the ‘erosion in globalisation’ can thus be estimated at about 
52 kilometres per year. 
Figure 7. Average length of supply chains for the export industry (1995-2016) 
 
The average length of supply chains by industry is calculated in Table 4, including the percentage change 
between 1995 and 2008 and between 2008 and 2016. All sectors experienced a significant growth in 
average distance between 1995 and 2008, except for ‘mining’. The longest supply chains were found in 
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the ‘ICT & electronics’ and ‘electrical equipment’ sectors, based on SNA 1993 figures. Manufacturing 
sectors have generally longer supply chains than services sectors. 
Between 2008 and 2016, the overall trend is a decline but there is a lot of variation across industries. 
For example, there is a strong increase in the distance of inputs for IT services (+37%). The highest 
decline is observed in ‘coke and petroleum’ industry (-15%). 
Table 4. Average length of supply chains for the export industry, by industry (1995, 2008 and 
2016) 
 
6.1 Average distance from output to final consumption 
In the previous section, we calculated the average length of supply chains, looking backward at all the 
suppliers of inputs. Once goods and services are produced, they also have to cover some distance before 
reaching final consumers. This can be seen as the last leg in the value chain from “farm to table”, 
although we prefer to treat it separately since firms sourcing decisions may be more sensitive to the cost 
and time of distance than the “sourcing” decisions of the consumers.  
1995 2008 1995/2008 2008 2016 2008/2016
Agriculture 1393 1799 29% 1767 1668 -6%
Mining 888 870 -2% 790 1032 31%
Food products 1732 2251 30% 2052 1986 -3%
Textiles & apparel 1981 2994 51% 2388 2470 3%
Wood 1809 2517 39% 2084 2245 8%
Paper and printing 1582 2190 38% 2009 2030 1%
Coke, petroleum 2455 3561 45% 3750 3172 -15%
Chemicals 1661 2738 65% 2418 2149 -11%
Rubber & plastics 1789 2752 54% 2510 2364 -6%
Non-metal minerals 1304 2434 87% 2051 2174 6%
Basic metals 2080 3285 58% 3201 3016 -6%
Fabricated metals 1793 2856 59% 2641 2595 -2%
ICT & electronics 2922 4234 45% 3725 3398 -9%
Electrical equipment 2223 3473 56% 2913 2897 -1%
Machinery 1763 2763 57% 2466 2394 -3%
Motor vehicles 2304 3200 39% 2807 2719 -3%
Other transport 2364 3443 46% 2941 2846 -3%
Other manufacturing 1951 2813 44% 2315 2307 0%
Utilities 823 1222 49% 1476 1359 -8%
Construction 1344 1849 38% 1509 1804 20%
Wholesale & retail 748 1058 41% 983 1029 5%
Transport & storage 1209 1863 54% 1848 1593 -14%
Hotels & restaurants 1166 1374 18% 1262 1324 5%
Publishing, broadcasting 1378 1225 -11%
Telecoms 854 1247 46% 1278 1521 19%
IT services 1116 1255 12% 1112 1525 37%
Finance & insurance 783 1124 44% 1238 1358 10%
Real estate 461 541 17% 609 597 -2%
Other business services 817 1192 46% 1043 1028 -1%
Public admin 1262 1496 19% 840 796 -5%
Education 705 875 24% 590 625 6%
Health 798 1124 41% 962 946 -2%
Other services 1027 1224 19% 1177 1212 3%
Industry (ISIC 3/ISIC 4)
TiVA SNA 1993 TiVA SNA 2008
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The calculation of this average distance is straightforward as the final products travel only once and 
the country of final consumption is directly indicated in the ICIO. The distance from output to final 
consumption in industry j is simply an average of the bilateral distance between the country of industry 
j (country of final production) and the country k of final consumption, weighted by the share of each 
country k in final consumption of products from j, 
 
(18)         𝑑𝑗
𝐹 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑘𝑑𝑗𝑘𝑘 , 
where 𝛼𝑗𝑘 = 𝐹𝑗𝑘 ∑ 𝐹𝑗𝑘𝑘⁄ . Note that this measure is therefore different from the “expected distance to 
final destination” calculated by Los and Temurshoev (2012), which includes both the intermediate legs 
of the supply chain (forward in the input-output structure of the world economy) and the final leg(s) to 
the consumers.  
Figure 8 illustrates the average distance to final markets for the export industry. Between 1995 and 
2008, we observe an increase in the average distance travelled by final goods and services, but not as 
important as the one observed for inputs (Figure 7). Note also the “spikes” in the index at the midst of 
the financial crises in 2001 and then in 2008-2009. During crises, the consumption of durable goods 
generally falls more than the consumption of non-durable goods (Bems et al., 2010) thus modifying the 
geography of trade. Bulky durable goods travel less and are subject to higher trade costs. Crises-ridden 
countries may also have offloaded huge volumes at discounted prices to “non-traditional” markets in 
other regions to keep the wheels moving in the industry. 
Interestingly, the decline in the distance to final consumption after 2012 is also less pronounced than 
the one observed for inputs. It is consistent with protectionist measures targeting intermediate inputs 
rather than final goods before the ‘tariff war’ (Bown, 2018). Moreover, while firms may find some 
advantages in reducing the length of their supply chains, it is less in their interest to limit the geographic 
scope of consumers they serve. There are however trends, such as the servitisation of manufacturing 
(Baines et al., 2009), that would push for production closer to consumers (which can still be served by 
global firms through foreign affiliates). 
Figure 8. Average distance to final consumption for the export industry (1995-2016) 
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6.2 The sensitivity do distance: comparing intermediate and final goods 
Let us finally compare the sensitivity to distance for intermediate and final goods for the export industry, 
using sector weights in exports. We already know from the previous analysis that inputs travel more 
legs and therefore longer distances in total throughout the input-output structure of the world economy 
than final goods that cover only one leg. However, to compare the sensitivity to distance of inputs and 
final goods, we should rather compare a typical intermediate leg (read, the average distance to the first-
tier suppliers) with the final leg to the consumption markets. In other words, do firms source inputs from 
more nearby markets than when they sell their final goods? As evident in Figure 9 the answer is yes: 
distance matters more for inputs than for final goods. 
Figure 9 confirms that whether it is the impact of protectionism or some structural change, the 
decrease in the length of value chains is for intermediate inputs. But interestingly, the decrease is smaller 
for the first intermediate leg, suggesting that it is more upstream that value chains have shrunk. Coming 
back to Table 4, it is indeed in some raw material industries (‘coke and petroleum’ and ‘chemicals’) that 
the length of supply chains has decreased the most. 
Figure 9. The sensitivity to distance in the export industry (1995-2016) 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Using the Leontief model in an international setting, this paper has provided an empirical analysis of the 
share of foreign value-added in exports, the number of production stages embodied in exports and the 
average length of supply chains over the period 1995-2016. The evidence points in the same direction. 
There was first a fragmentation and an internationalization of production between 1995 and 2008 that 
justifies the emergence of the concept of ‘global value chains’ in the last decade. 
However, at the same time that the concept of GVC was mainstreamed in economic analysis and in 
policy fora (Gereffi, 2019), globalisation has slowed down and based on the indicators presented in this 
paper we can indeed confirm that GVCs are becoming shorter both in terms of the number of production 
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stages and the average geographic distance travelled by inputs. If we define globalisation narrowly in 
terms of international fragmentation of production, there is a deglobalisation since 2012. 
Even at the peak of globalisation (in 2008 before the Great Financial Crisis or in 2012 where the pre-
crisis levels of fragmentation were observed again), most of the inputs used in exports were domestic. 
If the share has decreased in the recent period, there is still between one third and one quarter of the 
value added in exports which is of foreign origin. Foreign inputs are mostly sourced from countries that 
are geographically close (as would be expected in a gravity framework). But when GVCs were 
expanding between 1995 and 2008, this is the extra-regional value-added that increased in exports, while 
regional shares were remaining stable. In the recent period, we see more regional value chains in some 
region. 
Our data document a decline in the international fragmentation of production but cannot explain the 
main drivers behind this phenomenon. The chronology, countries and industries affected point to 
protectionism as one of the main determinants of the recent changes observed. However, the data suggest 
that value chains are becoming shorter rather than just shifting from being international to domestic. 
This indicates that, in addition to protectionism, there are other structural changes that could be related 
to technological advances (the digital transformation) or some shift in consumer tastes (ageing of 
population, environmental challenges) or business models (servitisation of manufacturing, mass 
customisation). Input-output data need to be tested against other types of indicators to further investigate 
the causes of deglobalisation. 
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